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RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS

RES IPSA LOQUITUR AND MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS:
TIME FOR BETROTHAL
During the median years of the twentieth century, the expansion of complex technology into all areas of everyday life has necessitated a high degree
of specialization in many fields. In medicine, for example, new discoveries and
the perfection of old techniques have rendered the general practitioner an increasing rarity. Consultation and cooperation among medical specialists have
become a necessity in the treatment of most patients. Reflecting the altered
views and needs of society the law too has undergone rapid transformation.
One significantly changing area has been the law of torts, which has experienced many changes in what was once considered settled law., Typical of
the rapid changes in the early seventies, Florida's experience has involved the
adoption of many new views including expansion of the traditional definition
of an invitee; 2 acceptance of the concept of comparative, rather than contributory negligence;3 relaxation of the more rigid aspects of the attractive
nuisance doctrine; 4 alteration of the concepts of premises liability to recognize
a distinction between active and passive negligence; 5 and recognition of an
expanded right of privacy, even between husband and wife.6 Florida's decisions, like the majority of those throughout the country, have generally
benefited the injured plaintiff.7 While the reasons for each individual decision
obviously vary, an influential, if unexpressed, factor in all seems to be that the
original goals of a particular rule were no longer being attained.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is illustrative of this phenomenon, for
increased specialization has resulted in the frustration of both the equitable
and societal goals that the doctrine was initially meant to achieve. The growing number of multiple party transactions has made it increasingly difficult
for injured persons to identify who or, less frequently, what caused their injuries - even when it is apparent that one or more of the involved parties was
necessarily negligent. As a result, several courts8 have relaxed the rigid requirements for invocation of res ipsa to allow use of,.the doctrine against

1. W. PROssER, LAW OF TORTS xi (4th ed. 1971).
2. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973); Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1972).
3. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
4. Green Springs, Inc. v. Calvera, 239 So. 2d 264 (Fla. 1970).
5. Billen v. Hix, 260 So. 2d 284 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1972).
6. Markham v. Markham, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
7. PROSsER, supra note 1, at xi. Prosser observes, however, that the "recognition of the
constitutional privilege in the fields of defamation and privacy ... must rank as the greatest
victory for the defendants in this century." Id.
&. E.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Prost v. Des Moines
Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa 294, 79 N.W.2d 306 (1956); Meyer v. St.
Paul-Mercury Indem. Co., 61 So. 2d 901 (La. App. 1952); Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial
Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.V.2d 166 (1966). Contra, Rhodes v. De Haan, 184 Kan. 473,
337 P.2d 1043 (1959); Talbot v. Doctor W.H. Groves' Latter-Day Saint Hosp., Inc., 21 Utah
2d 73, 440 P.2d 872 (1968).
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multiple defendants. 9 An obvious application of these relaxed requirements
may occur in medical malpractice suits where numerous specialized personnel
are involved in the treatment of one patient.'0 In such instances, if an unexplained and unrelated injury occurs, the patient, who was probably sedated
at the time, is usually unable to make any specific charges of negligence. Only
the attending personnel are capable of testifying to the cause of injury. Those
courts allowing the patient to invoke res ipsa against the several defendants
most likely to possess such information have enabled the original goals and
equities of the doctrine to be realized. In addition, res ipsa has been extended
to multiple defendants likely to possess superior knowledge in three other
types of cases: those involving falling objects,1 vehicular collisions, 1- and exploding bottles. 13 This commentary will examine res ipsa as a means for joining multiple defendants when they possess greater knowledge of the facts concerning the injury than the injured plaintiff.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE DOCTRINE OF

Res Ipsa Loquitur

Res ipsa loquitur is a form of circumstantial evidence that permits an
inference of negligence from the occurrence of the accident itself, if certain

conditions are satisfied. First evolving in 1863 when a flour barrel "rolled out
' 14
of the window of an English warehouse and into the lives of all tort lawyers,"
the descriptive phrase used in the judicial decision 5 quickly emerged into a
doctrine of tort law. Within two years principles for application of res ipsa
were formulated by another court,' 6 and the doctrine was soon accepted in the

9. Even under the relaxed requirements, the doctrine will apply only to cases that laymen know do not usually occur without negligence. Sanchez v. Rodriguez, 226 Cal. App. 2d
439, 38 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1964).
10. In all but the most simple treatments today, several personnel are involved with the
treatment and each exercises some control over the patient's body. The imposition of the
procedural burden of res ipsa in cases where an unexplained injury occurs not only provides
the patient with the opportunity for an explanation that he would most likely otherwise not
receive, but also stands as an added incentive for the personnel to exercise greater care in
avoiding the accident.
11. E.g., Corcoran v. Banner Super Market, 19 N.Y.2d 425, 227 N.E.2d 304, 280 N.Y.S.2d
385 (1967); Schroeder v. City & County Say. Bank, 293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
12. E.g., Weddle v. Phelan, 177 So. 407 (La. App. 1937); Czekala v. Meehan, 20 N.Y.2d
686, 229 N.E.2d 230, 282 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1967).
13. E.g., Nichols v. Nord, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212,
93 A.2d 451 (1953).
14. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California, 37 CALUF. L. REv. 183 (1949) (referring to
the English case of Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863)).
15. "There are certain cases of which it may be said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems
one of them." Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299, 300 (Ex. 1863) (emphasis added).
16. "There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. But where the thing is shewn
to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as
in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants,
that the accident arose from want of care." Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 159
Eng. Rep. 665, 667 (Ex. 1865).
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United States. 17 It has since been adopted, in one form or another, by all
American jurisdictions.18
While the reason for its first enunciation may have been primarily equitable,19 the ready adoption of res ipsa by other courts is better explained as a
wise societal choice. Imposition of a procedural burden on the defendant2O not
only spreads the cost of the injury suffered by the plaintiff who is unable to
prove negligence because of the circumstances, 21 but also places an incentive
for preventing future accidents on the only party able to do so -the defendant.22
The acceptance of res ipsa as a means of implementing these goals was so
rapid that a well-defined body of law soon developed. By 1904 Dean Wigmore
had expressed the rule in a statement 23 still generally followed today,2 4 limiting the use of the doctrine to cases where the injury-producing accident was:
(1) of the type that usually does not occur in the absence of negligence, (2)
caused without contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff,25 and (3)
caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant.
The inclusion of this third limitation was a natural outgrowth of the policy
of preventing future accidents, since only if the defendant had control of the
instrumentality could he effectively avert a recurrence.
The substantive rules of the doctrine were generally accepted by all jurisdictions, but its procedural effects differed widely. The differing views concerning the application and effect of res ipsa derive in no small measure from
17. George v. St. Louis I. M. 9- S. Ry., 34 Ark. 613 (1879).
18. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 213.
19. Under the circumstances of Byrne v. Boadle the judge may have felt compelled to
allow a method for the plaintiff to recover, since the defendant in that case was so obviously negligent.
20. The extent of the burden differs among jurisdictions, though the majority treat the
imposition of the doctrine as merely giving rise to an inference of negligence, establishing a
prima facie case for the plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 27-31 infra.
21. In all of these cases the plaintiff had no access to the facts concerning the accident
and was unable to present evidence attesting to the defendants' culpability. By allowing the
plaintiff the procedural advantage of the doctrine, the cost of the accident was borne by
those most likely responsible for its occurrence. These parties no doubt passed this added
cost of their enterprise on to their customers, but the added cost incurred by each was
minimal when compared to the possibility of the plaintiff having to bear the entire cost.
See generally G. CAIABaRasi, THE CoST OF AcciDENTs (1970); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
22. This rationale assumes not only that the defendants in a particular suit will attempt

to avoid future accidents of a like kind, but also that the other parties in the particular
kind of enterprise will revise their methods of doing business to prevent the occurrence of
such accidents involving their own business. Also, by holding these parties liable, the costs of
the accidents are added to the cost of the enterprise that caused them.
23. 4 J. WIGMoma, EvmENca §2509 (1st ed. 1904).
24. E.g.,. Panico v. American Export Lines., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1962);
Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960); Anderson v. Sarasota County
Pub. Hosp. Bd., 214 So. 2d 655 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
25. In those jurisdictions, such as Florida, that have adopted comparative negligence,
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), this requirement will no longer limit the
imposition of the doctrine, but will merely serve to reduce damages.
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an early commingling of two bodies of law: the concern with the sufficiency of
evidence involved in the falling barrel case2 6 and an earlier line of cases shifting the burden of proof to common carriers because of their extraordinary
duty of care.2 7 Out of this confusion three views have arisen as to the doctrine's
effect. A majority of states, including Florida, follow the theory that invocation of res ipsa gives rise to an inference of negligence, establishing a prima
facie case for the plaintiff.2 8 The remaining jurisdictions consider the doctrine
as either: (1) giving rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence,- or (2)
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. 30 Unless the defendant offers
sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption, courts following the former view
will allow a directed verdict for the plaintiff. In jurisdictions where res ipsa
loquitur shifts the burden of proof, the defendant's evidence must outweigh
that of the plaintiff.

31

While the differences among jurisdictions as to the procedural effect of the
doctrine have caused some reluctance to apply it to multiple defendants,32 a
greater obstacle has been a disagreement as to the necessity for strict application of 1Aigmore's exclusive control requirement.33 Even more controversial
has been the suggestion that the defendant's greater access to the facts can
either constitute a fourth requirement or substitute for exclusive control. 34

26. Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863).
27. E.g., Christie v. Griggs, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (Ex. 1809); Loudoun v. Eighth Ave. R.R.,
162 N.Y. 380, 56 N.E. 988 (1900). For cases illustrating the commingling process, see, e.g.,
Central R.R. v. Freeman, 66 Ga. 170 (1880); Cleveland, C.C. & I.R.R. v. Newell, 104 Ind. 264,
3 N.E. 836 (1885).
28. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 228-29. The United States Supreme Court has followed this
approach, holding that: "[R]es ipsa loquitur means that the facts of the occurrence warrant
the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference . . . they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence where direct evidence . .. may be lacking . . . it is evidence
to be weighed . . . call[ing] for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily [accepted].
Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240 (1913).
29. E.g., Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 259 Ala. 56, 65 So. 2d 169 (1953); Coca Cola
Bottling Co. v. Mattice, 219 Ark. 428, 243 S.W.2d 15 (1951); Ten Ten Chestnut St. Corp. v.
Quaker State Bottling Co., 186 Pa. Super. 585, 142 A.2d 306 (1958).
30. E.g., Weiss v. Axler, 137 Colo. 544, 328 P.2d 88 (1958); Jones v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 185 La. 1067, 171 So. 4,17 (1936); Johnson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 239 Miss. 759,
125 So. 2d 537 (1960).
31. In the former case, the defendant's burden is merely that of submitting evidence to
rebut the presumption; the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff. In those jurisdictions
that actually shift the burden of proof, Prosser has observed that they are usually forced to
establish two forms of res ipsa cases, with one type creating only an inference. PROssm, supra
note 1,at 230.
32. Especially in those jurisdictions that shift the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant, there is an understandable hesitancy to apply the doctrine in cases where some of
the defendants may have been non-negligent. Even though they may have had concurrent
control of the instrumentality causing the injury, they may be as incapable of explaining the
accident as the plaintiff. To shift the burden of proof in such a case would seem inequitable,
even where the imposition of a mere inference would not.
33. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
34. Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants,
84 ALBANY L. REv. 106, 109 (1969).
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THE "CoNToL" CONTROVERSY
The application of res ipsa to multiple defendants in a particular case is
largely dependent upon a jurisdiction's attitude toward the requirements of
exclusive control and superior knowledge, since the doctrine is clearly inapplicable if Dean Wigmore's first two requirements are not met.35 Early cases
refused to apply res ipsa to multiple defendants because of a strict interpreta-

tion of the exclusive control requirement.36 This literal application of the
word "exclusive" led a Rhode Island court to deny recovery to a customer
injured in a store when a chair collapsed because "the store was not in exclusive control" of the chair.37
While interpretations of exclusive "control" have often been relaxed in
cases dealing with single defendants, 3s the control requirement precluded application of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants until several courts 9 became willing to accept the concept of "concurrent control." This concept was
first recognized in Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc.40 where a New Jersey
court held that res ipsa could be maintained against both a landowner and a
sign company when a small sign advertising the company fell from the landowner's sign and injured a passerby. The court reasoned that the shared con-

trol and duty of both parties to the plaintiff was sufficient to invoke the
doctrine.
The concurrent control concept was followed under similar circumstances
in a New York case 41 and extended to automobile collisions42 and bursting

bottles43 in other jurisdictions. While these were somewhat isolated decisions,
the concept of concurrent control was developing fully in California. The
California courts first relaxed the exclusive control requirements in cases in-

35. Id.
36. E.g., Harrison v. Sutter St. Ry., 134 Cal. 349, 66 P. 787 (1901); Schott v. Pancoast
Properties, 57 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1952); Wolf v. American Tract Soc'y, 164 N.Y. 30, 58 N.E. 31
(1900).
37. The court affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant because both "user" and
"control" of the chair were in the plaintiff "at the time of the injury." Kilgore v. Shepard
Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 A. 720 (1932). This mechanical interpretation of the requirement for
control fails to take into account the underlying rationale of the requirement that the defendant, not some third party, was most likely negligent.
38. These generally occurred when the physical possession of the instrumentality was
with the plaintiff, although the responsibility for the condition of the article was that of
the defendant. E.g., Killian v. Logan, 115 Conn. 437, 162 A. 30 (1932); Sweet v. Swangel, 166
N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1969); Couris v. Casco Amusement Corp., 333 Mass. 740, 133 N.E.2d 250
(1956).
39. E.g., Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 110 NJ. 326, 164 A. 423 (1933); Schroeder
v. City & County Sav. Bank, 293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
40. 110 NJ. 326, 164 A. 423 (1933).
41. Schroeder v. City & County Sav. Bank, 293 N.Y. 370, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
42. E.g., Bonner v. Boudreaux, 8 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 1942); Weddle v. Phelan, 177 So.

407 (La. App. 1937).
43. E.g., Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Loch v. Confair,
212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).
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volving single defendants, 44 but later allowed joinder of a doctor and a hos45
pital under res ipsa.
This concept of exclusive control became fully established in California in
the landmark case of Ybarra v. Spangard.4 6 During the course of an appendectomy the patient suffered an injury to his shoulder, apparently the result of a trauma or strain applied between his shoulder and neck. The patient
was allowed to use res ipsa against "all those defendants47 who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries." 48 This holding, seemingly ignoring the "control" aspect of res ipsa,49
was both praised as a method of overcoming the "conspiracy of silence"5
permeating medical malpractice cases and condemned as ignoring the functional requirements of the doctrine. 51
Although the court recognized that the patient had identified neither the
particular defendant responsible for the injury nor the instrumentality causing
52
the harm, it observed that the:

[C]ontrol at one time or another, of one or more of the various agencies
or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the
hands of every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants.
This, we think, places upon them the burden of initial explanation.
Plaintiff was rendered unconscious for the purpose of undergoing surgical treatment by the defendants; it is manifestly unreasonable for them
to insist that he identify any one of them as the person who did the
alleged negligent act.
44. The doctrine was first allowed in common carrier situations. E.g., Bush v. Barnett,
96 Cal. 202, 31 P.2d (1892) (overturned stagecoach); Mitchell v. Southern Pac. R.R., 87 Cal.
62, 25 P. 245 (1890) (derailment of a train). It was then expanded to allow its use when
the passenger was in a private vehicle. Godfrey v. Brown, 220 Cal. 57, 29 P.2d 165 (1934).
One commentator has observed that "once the court took this step, ignoring the requirement
for exclusive control ... then in principle there was no valid objection against joining both
persons in a single action with the plaintiff relying on res ipsa loquitur." Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 2 WASH. U.L.Q. 215, 217
(1954).
45. Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P.2d 740 (3d Dist. 1935).
46. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
47. Joined in the single suit were the diagnostician, the surgeon, the owner of the hospital, the anaesthetist, and two nurses.
48. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 494, 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944).
49. Whereas all of the defendants had a duty to the patient, some of the defendants'
responsibility had ceased by the time the injury was discovered. Under such circumstances,
critics of Ybarra contend that none of the defendants were in exclusive or even concurrent
control. For an explanation of the court's rationale, see text accompanying note 59 infra.
50. E.g., 2 F. HARPER 9: F. JAMEs, THE LAW OF TORTS §19.7, at 1089 (1956); Louisell &
Williams, Res Ipsa Loquitur-Its Future in Medical Malpractice Cases, 48 CALF. L. Ruv.
252 (1960); Thode, The Unconscious Patient: Who Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained
Injuries to a Healthy Part of His Body?, 1969 UTAH L. REv. I; Note, supra note 34.
51. E.g., Adamson, Medical Malpractice: Misuse of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 46 MINN. L. Ray.
1043 (1962); Prosser, supra note 14; Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical
Malpractice Law -Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. Ray. 251
(1962); Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitur: Tabula in Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 643 (1950).
52. 25 Cal. 2d 486, 493, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (1944).
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Further, the court restated the control requirement, holding that "the test
has become one of right of control rather ihan actual control."'53 Such a test
recognizes that the strict application of the control requirement may lead to
patently unjust and untenable results- 4 and that the changing circumstances
of modern life necessitate a reevaluation of the requirement in order to
realize the original goals of the res ipsa doctrine. Each defendant had a duty
to protect the patient from harm and each shared the right of control over the
instruments that might have caused the injury. Since the defendants acted independently, 55 the patient could invoke res ipsa loquitur only if he could join
those sharing primary responsibility.56 Otherwise he would face a fate similar
to a Florida plaintiff whose case was dismissed for failure to eliminate every
57
other hypothesis of negligence.
Apparently most disagreement with Ybarra stems from a different interpretation of the concept of control and a reluctance to impose joint liability on
multiple defendants when most of them are likely to be innocent of any wrongdoing.56 Critics of the decision apparently distinguish between the successive
or shared control of Ybarra and the concurrent control of the non-transferable
duty cases.59 Such a distinction seems illogical, since in the cases involving

53. Id. Under the circumstances of the case the court was referring to the control of the
external forces that must have caused the injury, not a specific instrumentality. The court
reasoned that a more stringent requirement "would unreasonably limit the application of
the ...

rule." Id.

54. Failure to recognize that the changing circumstances of society require a reevaluation
of the requirements of the rule to determine whether the original goals are still being attained would result in cases as unrealistic today as was the Rhode Island case in 1932. Kilgore v. Shepard Co., 52 R.I. 151, 158 A. 720 (1932). An example outside the malpractice
area is an exploding bottle case. Since several parties normally have exercised control of the
bottle, failure to allow the use of the doctrine because there was no exclusive control by one
defendant would violate the original goals of res ipsa. Prosser apparently agrees with the
court on this point. "Control ...must be a very flexible term. It must be enough that the
is
defendant has the right or power of control, and the opportunity to exercise it .... [I]t
enough that he shares the duty and the responsibility." PROSSER, supra note 1, at 220.
55. The anaesthetist and one of the nurses were employed by the hospital and could
therefore be considered as conferring vicarious liability on the owner. However, the diagnostician, the surgeon, and the other nurse were independent of the hospital and each
other and, considered with the hospital owner, constitute four independent parties.
56. By limiting the joined parties to those who shared the primary responsibility, the
court avoided the possible defense that some other minor party had the opportunity to control an instrumentality that could have caused the injury, thereby requiring dismissal of the
suit for failure of the control requirement of res ipsa. Naturally, if the defendants could
prove this, they would not be liable. Limiting joinder to the primary parties avoided the
possibility that the mere suggestion of a minor party's control might result in non-application of res ipsa.
57. Martin v. Powell, 101 So. 2d 610 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). This court seemingly ignored
the fact that allowing the plaintiff to base his case on res ipsa would have merely required
the defendant to come forth with evidence of his non-negligent conduct.
58. "The conscience of the law is hardly salved by affording an innocent man a remedy
against another innocent man." Adamson, supra note 51, at 1047.
59. E.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936) (surgeon allowed nurse to count
sponges); Voss v. Bridwell, 188 Kan. 643, 364 P.2d 955 (1961) (same); Barb v. Farmers Ins.
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falling objects neither defendant was in simultaneous control, although they
did have concurrent duties at the time of injury. In Ybarra, the time of injury was not known; rather there was a period of time in which the harm
could have occurred. During that timespan each defendant had a duty to the
patient, even though some of the duties did not exist throughout the entire
period. When the time of injury is thus viewed as an interval rather than an
instant of time each defendant can be deemed to have had a concurrent duty
much like the falling object cases. 60
SUPERIOR KNOWLEDGE AS AN ALTERNATIVE REQUIREMENT

The decision to apply res ipsa in Ybarra was based upon both the court's
realization that a patient unconscious at the time of injury is unable to testify
as to the circumstances of the injury 6l and its recognition of the special relationship between doctor and patient. 2 The superior knowledge facet of res
ipsa has long been considered by some authorities as one of the underlying
purposes of the doctrine; Wigmore first expressed it in 1904 as being "the
particular force and justice of the presumption. ' '6 3 Nevertheless, the special
knowledge doctrine has also been the object of criticism, particularly by
Prosser, who believed that it could never be a controlling factor.64
Prosser's view apparently relies on cases where the existence or non-existence of the defendant's superior knowledge was an unnecessary consideration, since the defendants clearly met the control requirement. Although
access to facts will not always be a factor in the application of res ipsa
loquitur, it becomes a relevant inquiry when there is a question of control.66

Exch., 281 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. 1955) (object belonging to one defendant falling from property
of the other); Smith v. Claude Neon Lights, Inc., 110 N.J. 326, 164 A. 423 (1933) (same).
60. Even viewing the case as solely one of successive control, denying the patient an explanation and compensation for his injury seems, under the circumstances, to ignore the
original equitable and societal function of the doctrine. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
61. The court observed that the defendants were the only parties in a position to
identify the instrumentality. Under such conditions of superior knowledge on the part of
the defendants, the court contended that to require the patient to identify the instrumentality would be a "misconception which, if carried to the extreme for which defendants contend, would unreasonably limit [the doctrine]." 25 Cal. 2d at 492-93, 154 P.2d at 690.
62. Id. at 491, 154 P.2d at 690.
63. 4 J. WIGMoRE,EvIDENCE §2509, at 3557 (1st ed. 1904).
64. Prosser, supra note 14, at 202-04.
65. Id. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 225. Much of his argument is intended to refute
those courts that would require the defendant to possess superior knowledge in order for
the doctrine to be invoked. Nevertheless, the cases relied on, while suited to this conclusion,
do not support the statement that superior knowledge could never be a controlling factor.
E.g., Cox v. Northwest Airlines, 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967) (airplane disappeared in
fight); Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 P. 1020 (1885) (an explosion that
destroyed all the witnesses). While res ipsa was invoked in these cases where the defendant
did not possess superior knowledge, there was no question that the control requirement was
satisfied. Thus, the use of superior knowledge as an alternative to the control requirement
was not at issue.
66. If the defendants are in a position to know the facts or to show that their actions
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An analogous situation arises in those bailment cases involving the destruction
of property; the bailee, who is in a better position to explain the loss, is required to offer evidence that the destruction was not due to his negligence.6 7
It would seem anomalous to give a bailor the benefit of such a rule when his
property has been destroyed, but to deny it to a plaintiff who has suffered an
unexplained bodily injury.
As noted earlier, application of res ipsa loquitur to multiple defendants is
particularly appropriate in four factual situations: medical malpractice, falling
objects, vehicular collisions, and exploding bottles. While application of the
doctrine to such situations may be clear when a single defendant or instrumentality is involved, difficulties arise when it is not known who or what
caused the injury. Because questions of identity conflict with the control requirement, most courts are unwilling to apply the doctrine unless the case
involves vicarious liability, 8 joint control,O or joint tortfeasors.O Until recently71 Florida followed an even stricter view, allowing joinder of multiple
defendants under res ipsa only when they were joint tortfeasors.72 Where the
defendants are in a position of superior knowledge this approach is almost as
illogical as the Rhode Island court's refusal to apply the doctrine because of
the lack of "exclusive control." 73 If res ipsa loquitur is treated as merely giving
rise to an inference of negligence based on circumstantial evidence, as is gen-

were non-negligent, the plaintiff should not be nonsuited, since application of the doctrine,
with its accompanying inference, will allow him to reach the jury. The defendants will thus
be forced to present evidence of their innocence or risk the possibility of liability. If the
defendants rebut the inference, authorities are divided as to whether the case should then
go to the jury. See Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitur Vindicated, 1 BuFFALO L. Rxv. 1 (1951).
67. See Thode, supra note 50, at 8-9. Even if the loss occurred by fire or theft, the
bailee must testify to that fact. It is then the bailor's burden to show the bailee negligent.
In all other cases of loss, the bailee has the burden of proving himself non-negligent. The
effect of the cases allowing the use of res ipsa in multiple defendant situations is to require
the defendants to offer similar evidence.
68. E.g., Knell v. Morris, 89 Cal. 2d 450, 247 P.2d 852 (1952); Schroeder v. City &
County Say. Bank, 293 N.Y. 870, 57 N.E.2d 57 (1944).
69. E.g., Waterbury v. Kiss & Co., 169 Kan. 271, 219 P.2d 678 (1950); Kelly v. Laclede
Real Estate &-Inv. Co., 848 Mo. 407, 155 S.W.2d 90 (1941).
70. E.g., Price v. McDonald, 7 Cal. App. 2d 77, 45 P.2d 425 (2d Dist. 1985); Pierce v.
Schroeder, 171 Kan. 259, 282 P.2d 460 (1951). Probably best known in this area is another
California case, Summer v. Tice, 88 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948) (the two defendants
negligently shot in the plaintiff's direction on a hunting trip and both were held liable for
the resulting injury).
71. See Holman v. Ford Motor Co., 239 So. 2d 40 (1st D.CA. Fla. 1970). The court
allowed the use of res ipsa against one defendant in an automobile case, although the plaintiff had specifically pleaded negligence against the other. Since this ignored the "exclusive
control" requirement to the extent that both parties were independent of each other, the
case would seem to indicate a willingness to accept the concurrent control concept, and possibly even the successive control of Ybarra.
72. E.g., Florida Tel. Corp. v. Wallace, 104 Fla. 566, 140 So. 472 (1982); Smith v. Coleman, 100 Fla. 1707, 182 So. 198 (1981); Symmes v. Prairie Pebble Phosphate Co., 66 Fla. 27,
68 So. 1 (1918).
73. See note 87 supra and accompaning text.
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erally the case,7 4 then the non-negligent defendant would normally be able to
introduce evidence that would relieve him of liability.

75

Several courts have gone so far as to allow joinder of defendants even when
the facts were such that some defendants were necessarily innocent.!6 These
courts allowed res ipsa to be used to shift the burden of presenting the evidence to the defendants because of their greater access to the facts. Such
joinder also effectuates the policy of compensating the innocent victims by
spreading losses through use of the insurance principle. 7 Although these decisions have been criticized for having gone too far,7 8 such policy factors should
not be ignored, since "the greater incentive for each defendant to produce
evidence that might exculpate himself will tend to produce the correct decision in many cases." 79 Additionally, the innocent defendant is protected by
the rule in a majority of jurisdictions allowing the jury to disregard the inference toward one or all of the defendants.8 0 In contrast, the injured plaintiff who is prohibited access to the jury because of his inability to identify the
tortfeasor, is denied any protection at all.
Medical malpractice cases involve an additional influential factor: the
special relationship between doctor and patient."' In addition to the superior
knowledge likely to be possessed by attending medical personnel, the relationship of confidence between patient and physician would seem to raise a moral

74. "It is generally recognized that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of law, but a rule of
evidence, allowing the proof of negligence by a permissible inference drawn by the jury
from circumstantial evidence." Note, supra note 44, at 219. See note 28 supra.
75. Such evidence will generally tend to show that the defendant was not negligent, although it could demonstrate that the accident could have occurred without the negligence
of anyone. An example of the former is found in Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329
F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
76. E.g., Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953) (plaintiff was injured by
exploding bottle and sued both the bottler and the retailer); Loch v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212,
93 A.2d 451 (1953) (identical facts). The foremost example is Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d
486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
77. See Note, supra note 34. Imposition of liability on the defendant through use of
res ipsa loquitur is justified as a cost to the enterprise of doing business. In most instances
the defendant is the party most likely to be able to avoid accidents and thus the one best
able to obtain insurance or absorb a loss. By requiring the defendant to answer for unexplained accidents and thereby to insure against them, the costs of accidents are kept within
the enterprise. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 21; Calabresi, supra note 21.
78. Note, supra note 34.
79. Comment, Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur and Doctrine of Exclusive ControlMultiple Defendants - Bottled Beverages, 27 TEMP. L.Q. 238, 241 (1953).
80. E.g., Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bonner v.
Boudreaux, 8 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 1942).
81. See D. LouISELL & H. WILLIAMs, TRIAL OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES 111114.02-.03
(1960). This relationship and the so-called "conspiracy of silence" doctrine have led several
courts to extend the doctrine and require defendants to produce the evidence, even though
many of them necessarily were not negligent. E.g., Patrick v. Sedwich, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska
1964); Tomei v. Henning, 67 Cal. 2d 319, 431 P.2d 633, 62 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1967); Ybarra v.
Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944); Herbert v. Travelers Indem. Co., 193 So. 2d
330 (La. App. 1966); Mayor v. Dowsett, 240 Ore. 196, 400 P.2d 234 (1965); Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., 32 Wis. 2d 132, 145 N.W.2d 166 (1966).
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obligation in the latter to come forward with the facts.8 2 Recognizing that this
moral obligation is often left unsatisfied, some commentators have lauded the
use of res ipsa by courts as a means of converting the moral obligation into
legal duty.8 3 Others, fearing that the use of res ipsa in these situations results
in an imposition of strict liability upon the medical profession, believe that
moral obligations should not be considered in tort law.8 4 These critics fear
that the Ybarra rule will be extended to cases where treatment merely failed to
85
effect a cure or where there was a recognizable risk of injury from the outset.
This apprehension has brought admonitions against burdening the physician's

medical judgment by requiring that he consider the possible legal ramifications of every act.8 6
Such criticism would be well founded if the logical result of Ybarra were
abandonment of Wigmore's first two requirements. No patient should expect
a guaranteed cure, but he should be able to anticipate that unforesseen in-

juries will be compensated unless a reasonable explanation shows that the injury did not result from improper treatment. The Florida courts have recogr
nized this notion in cases involving a single defendant, and neither the Florida courts nor those courts following Ybarra have allowed the use of res ipsa
Since
unless the injuries appeared to be the result of someone's negligence.,

even California has specifically refused to permit expansion solely because an
89
uncommon complication developed, there is no sound basis for predictions of
absolute liability in medical malpractice cases.

The professional stigma attached to the negligent physician is another factor apparently restricting the application of res ipsa in malpractice cases. The
Florida supreme court considers this issue the most important matter at

stake. 0 When multiple defendants are involved, however, the stigma attached

82. See Louisell & Williams, supra note 50. "It is no answer [to the policy of requiring
the physician to testify] to say that the ordinary man cannot reasonably be expected to make
a case against himself. The professional man is no ordinary man." Id. at 253.
83. Louisell & Williams, supra note 50; Thode, supra note 50. One commentator has
proposed a new rule of law "[w]here a special relationship exists between person A and
person or persons B, by virtue of which it is necessary that person A rely upon persons B
conducting themselves so as not to injure person A. Where there is a high degree of attendant risk to person A if persons B are negligent and where persons B are able to distribute the loss that might result to person A by insuring against a reasonably foreseeable
risk or by absorption of the loss in their operations; there arises a rebuttable presumption
that each of the persons B was negligent." Note, supranote 44, at 231.
84. Adamson, supra note 51, at 1047; Rubsamen, supra note 51.
85. Adamson, supra note 51.
86. Id.; Binder, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 218
(1968).
87. See West Coast Hosp. Ass'n v. Webb, 52 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1951); Hill v. Boughton,
146 Fla. 505, 1 So. 2d 610 (1941).
88. See cases cited notes 81, 87 supra.
89. Siverson v. Weber, 57 Cal. 2d 834, 372 P.2d 97, 22 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1960). The doctrine
has since been modified to apply only to cases laymen know do not usually occur without
medical negligence. Sanchez v. Rodriguez, 226 Cal. App. 2d 439, 38 Cal. Rptr. 110 (Ist Dist.

1964).
90.

Foster v. Thornton, 125 Fla. 699, 170 So. 459 (1936).
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to each individual physician is correspondingly lessened. At any rate, the
moral obligations of the defendants should far outweigh the possible stigma,
and policy and protective considerations should become the sole basis for determining whether the parties can be joined by use of res ipsa loquitur.
CONCLUSION

Most critics of Ybarra recognize that the underlying policy factors of res
ipsa merit the doctrine's application in most circumstances; 91 their disapproval
focuses upon the liberalization of the exclusive control requirement in suits
involving multiple defendants. Courts facing this issue have reached three conclusions: (1) the defendants cannot be joined due to failure of the exclusive
control requirement, (2) they can be joined if they were in concurrent control,
or (3) they can be joined if they possess superior knowledge and owe the
plaintiff a high degree of care. The first view is overly restrictive, demanding
literal compliance with a rule originally devised both to aid the injured plaintiff, when it was obvious someone had been negligent, and to reduce the frequency of such accidents.
The concurrent control concept, which is generally applied in the nonmalpractice cases, is probably the most widely accepted view today. Although
this view recognizes the possibility of an individual breach of duty, it precludes joinder unless all defendants were probably negligent. 92 Clearly an improvement over the older view, this concept fails to consider two factors. First,
it overlooks the desirability of risk distribution where commercial defendants
or parties generally covered by insurance are involved. 93 Second, as the number
of defendants grows, the inference of multiple liability diminishes, 9 4 precluding liability in all but the most obvious cases of multiple negligence. Recognition of these factors would seem to confer more benefit on the deserving plaintiff than harm on the innocent defendant.
Cases following the Ybarra rule have almost exclusively involved medical
malpractice, where the defendants normally possess superior knowledge and
owe their patients a high degree of care. The plaintiff has suffered the same
injury whether he can identify the negligent party or just those who were responsible for his care. He should not be denied compensation merely because

E.g., PROSSER, supra note 1, at 222-23; Jaffe, supra note 66.
Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple Defendants,
34 ALBANY L. REV. 106, 121 (1969).
93. See note 77 supra and accompanying text. These factors become even more important
in those jurisdictions treating the doctrine as merely giving rise to an inference of negligence,
since its application will result in an innocent defendant being held liable only in extreme
circumstances. E.g., Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (only
one defendant held liable); Bonner v. Boudreaux, 8 So. 2d 309 (La. App. 1942) (identical
result). Contra, Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (all defendants held
liable). See also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TRE LAW OF ToRTs (1956).
94. Comment, Torts-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Doctrine of Exclusive Control of the Instrument, 41 N.C.L. REV. 301 (1964).
91.
92.
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of his understandable inability to name the guilty party. Recognition of the
knowledge and duty of care elements in lieu of the control requirement can
afford the patient the protection he deserves.
Since the increasing specialization of society has resulted in a growing
number of multiple party situations, Florida courts should modify the requirements for using res ipsa loquitur so that injured patients are better protected
and the original goals of the doctrine are more nearly attained in the modern
setting. While protection might be extended by promulgating a new rule of
law,95 Florida's adoption of the Ybarra solution could more easily follow Professor Jaffe's observation that "the law has traditionally moved from one
doctrinal peak to another through the misty vales of fiction."' ' 6 Whichever
method is utilized, the unconscious patient should no longer be forced to bear
the burden of his unexplained and uncompensated injuries.
EDVARD F. KOREN

95. Louisell & Williams, supra note 50; Note, The Application of Res Ipsa Loquitur in
Suits Against Multiple Defendants, 2 WASH. U.L.Q. 215 (1954).
96. Jaffe, supra note 66.
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